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Changes in memory for previously neutral stimuli following  
the addition of threatening information 
Jessica M. Senn 
There are a number of aetiological pathways to the development of anxiety 
disorders, including those associated with stressful triggering situations.  It has been 
suggested that life events can provide new meaning to past situations, leading to the 
delayed onset of a disorder.  Whether or not a disorder will emerge is theoretically related 
to one‟s appraisal and memory of prior events, and memory biases are proposed to exist 
for threat-related information in association with anxiety disorders.  Given that a new 
event may change the meaning of past events, it is possible that threatening information 
can change one‟s memory for once neutral events.  The current study aimed to examine 
the effect of threatening information on memory for previously encoded (neutral) stimuli.  
Participants were 115 undergraduate students. Each participant learned 30 neutral objects 
(displayed in two boxes) and completed a recall memory test.  They were then randomly 
assigned to either receive new threatening or new neutral information about half of the 
already-learned objects (one of the boxes); a second recall test was subsequently 
completed. Individuals in the Threat condition showed a greater proportion of memory 
for items that were manipulated to items that remained neutral than did individuals in the 
No-Threat condition.  Results are discussed in terms of understanding memory bias and 
other cognitive features associated with anxiety disorders and of the onset and treatment 
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Changes in memory for previously neutral stimuli following 
the addition of threatening information 
Anxiety disorders are thought to have a number of different aetiological 
pathways, including those associated with stressful triggering situations (Rachman, 
1977).  Theories implicating fear conditioning in the genesis of anxiety disorders have 
been studied for decades (for a review, see Lissek et al., 2005). These theories suggest 
that the development of anxiety disorders can be related to the classical conditioning of a 
fear response, often based on the occurrence of specific triggering events. For example, 
an individual who is bitten by a dog will likely respond with fear in that situation, and 
may later experience fear when they see another dog (conditioned response). In many 
individuals this fear will be extinguished, but in others fear becomes their primary 
response in situations involving dogs, and pathological anxiety can result (Eysenck, 
1979). In a case such as the one described above, the fear is conditioned during or 
immediately following the occurrence of the triggering situation. Surprisingly, many 
psychological disorders can develop well after an individual encounters a specific 
stressor or situation that one would normally construe as potentially responsible for the 
onset of the problem. (Of course, a large proportion of anxiety disorders and other 
problems do not have an identifiable trigger or triggering situation, and these problems 
are not the focus of the current study). 
Of psychological disorders which have a genesis related to a specific stressor or 
situation, for example posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the majority have an onset 
that occurs immediately following the occurrence of the stressor (Buckley, Blanchard, & 





months, or even years have passed, such as in the diagnosis of PTSD with Delayed Onset. 
There are also anecdotal reports outside of the realm of PTSD of individuals developing 
fears after a substantial amount of time has passed. For example, one client who 
developed a fear of bee stings at least eight years following her only experience of a bee 
sting developed the fear only after having viewed a documentary about the production of 
honey. This anecdotal account provides evidence for the theory that fears can emerge 
suddenly with no apparent traumatic experience (Marks, 1969; Rachman, 1977), and can 
in fact be acquired through information or instruction rather than a specific traumatic 
event (Rachman, 1977). Although it has been confirmed that delayed onset occurs in 
PTSD, based on the above example as well as a number of other similar anecdotal 
descriptions, it is expected that other disorders may also have a genesis that can be 
delayed. 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition 
(DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) specifies a diagnosis of PTSD with 
Delayed Onset, which includes the criterion that at least six months have passed since the 
occurrence of the stressor. In some cases the disorder can develop after many years have 
passed without symptoms being present (Solomon, Kotler, Shalev, & Lin, 1989), and at 
least one case study has described an example of PTSD onset 30 years following the 
occurrence of the trauma (van Dyke, Zilberg, & McKinnon, 1985). 
There is little research on disorders with delayed onset other than PTSD. Given 
that PTSD is related to the occurrence of a specific (or multiple specific), identifiable 
traumatic event(s), it is relatively easy to determine the event that is associated with the 





had an impact on the genesis of other fears and anxiety disorders (Rachman, 1968). For 
this reason, the majority of evidence for the occurrence of disorders with delayed onset 
stems from research in the area of PTSD. 
Studies have shown that between five and ten percent of individuals who 
experience a traumatic event go on to develop PTSD (Bryant & Harvey, 2002; Gray, 
Bolton, & Litz, 2004; Wolfe et al., 1999). As previously mentioned, many of these cases 
are delayed in onset. For example, in a study of military veterans conducted by Bremner 
and colleagues (1996), 14 out of the 61 individuals who met criteria for PTSD did not 
meet these criteria until two or more years had passed since their military service. 
Furthermore, ten percent of individuals with delayed onset PTSD did not show symptoms 
immediately following the traumatic event (Carty, O‟Donnell, & Creamer, 2006). The 
occurrence of one or more life stressors following a traumatic event may account for the 
delayed onset of PTSD in individuals who initially had some symptoms but did not meet 
full criteria for the disorder (Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998; Herrmann & Eryavec, 
1994; Soloman et al., 1989). Additionally, Ehlers and Clark (2000) propose that 
subsequent events occurring in one‟s life may give a previous trauma a new, more 
threatening meaning, which could in turn lead to the delayed onset of PTSD. This 
reappraisal of threat may be an important factor in delayed onset in PTSD. It remains to 
be seen whether or not threat appraisal or reappraisal may be related to potential delayed 
onset in other psychological disorders. 
Memory for events in one‟s life, especially for those events which were 
interpreted as threatening, is an important factor in the development and maintenance of 





other psychological disorders such as social phobia (e.g., Cody & Teachman, 2010; 
Morgan, 2010), OCD (e.g., Radomsky & Rachman, 2004) and panic disorder (e.g., 
Hagenaars, van Minnen, Hoogduin, & Verbraak, 2009). One potential contributor to 
whether or not individuals will go on to develop these disorders relates to their memory 
of particular events as well as their appraisal(s) of these events (i.e., what meaning they 
give to the events; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Given that Ehlers and Clark (2000) have 
suggested that additional events occurring after an initial trauma can change the meaning 
of that trauma and potentially cause the onset of PTSD, it is possible that threatening 
information can impact or change one‟s memory for what were once neutral events.  
Memory biases associated with anxious arousal may have an effect on one‟s 
memory for threat-related situations. Memory biases in the context of depression have 
been demonstrated in a variety of investigations; however, research designed to 
assess/detect memory biases in anxiety has been less consistent (for reviews, see 
MacLeod & Mathews, 2004, and Mitte, 2008). This discrepancy in findings between the 
two domains is perplexing given that cognitive psychology theories predict the presence 
of memory biases within the context of emotional arousal (e.g., Bower, 1981), which 
should include both low mood and anxiety. According to Bower‟s theory, information 
that is more emotionally arousing and more contextually related will result in an increase 
in attentional and memorial resources allocated to this context-relevant information. 
Presumably, this understanding further extends to the experience of other negative 
reactions such as disgust, especially since disgust has been shown to be correlated with 






Many studies have demonstrated a memory bias for threat-related information. 
For example, Radomsky and Rachman (1999) compared a sample of contamination 
fearful participants diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) to anxious and 
nonanxious controls and found that they had greater memory for contaminated (versus 
noncontaminated) objects, whereas the control groups did not. An additional study 
demonstrated a memory bias for threat-related information in OCD, and found this effect 
to be even stronger when perceived responsibility is high (Radomsky, Rachman, & 
Hammond, 2001). There have also been studies showing memory biases related to other 
anxiety-related problems such as panic disorder (Nunn Stevenson, & Whalan, 1984; 
Cloitre & Liebowitz, 1991; Cloitre et al., 1994) and generalized anxiety disorder (Coles, 
Turk, & Heimberg, 2007). In addition to these studies which have empirically 
demonstrated a memory bias for anxiety-provoking stimuli, anxious patients often report 
powerful and highly detailed memories of specific events in which they were extremely 
anxious or fearful. 
Many reasons have been proposed as to why some studies have been unable to 
detect a memory bias for anxiety. Radomsky and Rachman (2004) have emphasized the 
importance of ecological validity in studying memory biases in anxiety disorders. It has 
been suggested that methodological limitations (especially related to ecological validity) 
were present in some previous investigations, such as using words as anxiety-eliciting 
stimuli; issues such as these may be responsible for difficulties in detecting a memory 
bias (Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; Radomsky, Rachman & Hammond, 2001). Words do 
not usually have the ability to make people feel anxious (Baddeley & Wilkins, 1984), and 





The current study included an examination of memory processing and cognitive 
change. Since cognitive change related to anxiety and fear is common in cases of delayed 
onset in PTSD, this study was designed to test whether or not this can also be seen in 
association with other types of anxiety. Specifically, the current study looked at what 
effect new threatening information had on memory for previously encoded (neutral) 
stimuli. Most prior research in this area has been related to studying the misinformation 
effect in the context of eyewitness testimonies (Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus, 1979; 
Wright, 1993). In such studies, participants are typically shown a slide show depicting the 
progression of an event (e.g., a car accident) and are subsequently read an additional brief 
description of the event that either confirms or misinforms the participant about a 
particular detail of the story (e.g., whether there was a stop sign or yield sign present). 
Many such studies have been conducted with results showing that the new information 
interferes with the participants‟ ability to remember the original information they 
encoded (Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus, 1979). These results imply that if an individual 
is given further information after an event, their memory for that original event can be 
altered. However, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) argue, and provide evidence for, the 
notion that the original memory is not actually impaired – alternatively, when 
remembering information about an event, the new information learned about that event is 
integrated into their memory of the event. Based on the findings presented by McCloskey 
and Zaragoza (1985), one would hypothesize that providing new post-event information 
can lead to that information being integrated into a comprehensive memory of that event.  
The current study examined whether or not memory for neutral stimuli could be 





threatening. Demonstrating this empirically would provide much needed information 
about one of many possible mechanisms involved in the aetiology of anxiety disorders, 
and especially in the genesis of anxiety disorders with delayed onset. In the current study, 
the construct of delayed onset was investigated by using spider fearful individuals and a 
tarantula as the threatening stimuli. 
I hypothesized that if neutral stimuli were encoded and then made threatening at a 
later time (through the provision of new information), there would be a subsequent 
increase in memory (i.e., memory bias) for stimuli that became threatening compared to 
those that remained neutral. Specifically, I hypothesized that the provision of either new 
threat or new neutral information would result in a greater proportion of memory for 
items that were manipulated to items that remained neutral in the group receiving 
threatening information, than for those receiving further neutral information. Due to 
hypermnesia (i.e., memory for information increases over time even without repeated 
learning; Ballard, 1913; Erdelyi & Becker, 1974), an increase in total memory over time 
was expected. Given that memorial systems have a certain capacity (Miller, 1956) that is 
unlikely to be surpassed regardless of the threat level of the new information, it was 
expected that overall recall memory performance would not differ between conditions, 
but that the proportion of items remembered that were manipulated (versus non-
manipulated) would be higher for the threat-related manipulation condition than for the 










 Participants were undergraduate students at Concordia University who 
participated in this study in order to earn course credit. A total of 120 individuals 
participated in the study; however, the data from five of these individuals were not 
included in the analyses due to either very poor memory performance (n = 1), or extreme 
levels of distress during the manipulation phase of the study (n = 4), as determined using 
the outlier exclusion method suggested by Tabachnick and Fidel (2007). The remaining 
115 participants were included in data analyses. They ranged in age from 18 to 57 (M = 
23.58, SD = 6.50) years. The majority of participants were female (86%) and identified 
themselves as Caucasian (77%). Sixty-one of the participants identified English as their 
first language (53%), and 85 reported speaking English at home (74%), either as the only 
spoken language, or in combination with one or more additional languages. 
 Participants were randomly assigned to either a Threat or No-Threat condition 
(see Procedures below). Following random assignment, there were fifty-five individuals 
in the Threat condition, with a mean age of 23.80 (SD = 7.17) years. Eighty-two percent 
of the individuals in the Threat condition were female. In the No-Threat condition there 
were 60 individuals with a mean age of 23.38 (SD = 5.88) years, 90 percent of whom 
were female. There were no significant differences between the two conditions in terms 
of age, t(113) = 0.34, p = .73, or sex, χ2(1) = 0.22, p = .64. 
 Mean scores on the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski & 
O‟Donohue, 1995), Spider Phobia Beliefs Questionnaire (SBQ; Arntz, Lavy, van den 





Thordarson et al., 2004), Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1990), Beck 
Depression Inventory-2 (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), and Disgust Scale (DS; 
Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994) were analyzed (see Measures below for details, and 
Appendix A for full measures) in order to assess the nature of the sample and to assess 
randomization (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations). Scores on these 
questionnaires were compared between conditions in order to detect any differences in 
anxiety, disgust, contamination, spider-related beliefs, or depression. There were no 
significant differences between the two conditions on spider-related fears, as evidenced 
by scores on the FSQ, t(113) = -1.18, p = .24, the SBQ, t(113) = -0.77, p = .44, the SBQ 
beliefs about spiders subscale, t(113) = -0.99, p = .32, or SBQ thoughts about spiders 
subscale, t(113) = -0.35, p = .73 There were no differences between conditions on 
measures of obsessive-compulsive symptomatology (VOCI scores, t(113) = -1.00, p = 
.32), the VOCI contamination subscale, t(113) = -0.94, p = .35, anxiety (BAI scores, 
t(113) = -0.32, p = .75), or depressive symptomatology (BDI-II scores, t(113) = -0.49, p = 
.62). A significant difference was found between conditions on the Disgust Scale, t(113) 
= -2.47, p = .015, with individuals in the No-Threat condition reporting a higher level of 
disgust sensitivity than those in the Threat condition. Due to this unexpected difference, 
scores on the Disgust Scale were entered as covariates for relevant analyses. 
Measures 
 Recall memory test. On two occasions during the study participants completed a 
free recall memory test. They were given three minutes to verbally name as many objects 







Mean Scores by Group on FSQ, SBQ, VOCI, BAI, BDI, and DS 
 Condition   
 Threat 
n = 55 
No-Threat 
n = 60 
Total 
n = 105 
Questionnaire Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
FSQ 20.64 27.01 27.12 31.57 24.02 29.53 
SBQ 881.31 1036.17 1043.67 1205.03 966.02 1125.49 
SBQ-B
+ 
661.89 644.92 794.62 774.45 731.14 715.44 
SBQ-T
++ 
219.42 414.50 249.05 486.49 234.88 451.77 
VOCI 27.05 21.23 31.52 25.93 29.38 23.80 
VOCI-CTN
+++ 
4.64 5.39 5.68 6.46 5.18 5.97 
BAI 9.04 7.45 9.50 7.95 9.28 7.68 
BDI 7.98 7.54 8.65 6.97 8.33 7.22 
DS 15.45* 4.71 17.68* 4.96 16.62 4.95 
Note. 
+
Denotes the subscale of the SBQ that measures spider-related beliefs, 
++
denotes 
the subscale of the SBQ that measures spider-related thoughts, 
+++
denotes the subscale of 
the VOCI that measures contamination-related symptomatology; * indicates a significant 










(see Procedures below). The experimenter recorded their answers verbatim, requesting 
clarification where necessary.  
Subjective Units of Distress (SUDS; Wolpe, 1958). The SUDS scale was used 
for individuals to rate their current level of distress on a 100-point scale, with 0 being no 
distress at all, and 100 being the most distress imaginable. This scale is typically used to 
rate anxiety levels (Wolpe, 1958), but a parallel rating system was also used for other  
purposes in this study. Specifically, participants were asked to use a 0-100 scale to rate 
their current negative emotions such as level of anxiety (typical SUDS rating), urge to 
wash their hands, and disgust (feelings of disgust as well as how willing they would be to 
eat their lunch out of each of two boxes shown to them earlier). Participants were also  
asked about how happy they felt, how relaxed they felt, how hungry they were, and the 
likelihood of them using similar boxes to the boxes in the study at home. These questions 
were asked in order to draw focus away from questions pertaining to anxiety and disgust 
and create uncertainty about the purpose of the study, intending to increase believability 
of the manipulation.  
Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; Thordarson et al., 
2004). The VOCI is a 55-item scale that assesses a range of obsessive compulsive 
symptoms such as checking, contamination, hoarding, “just right” feelings, 
indecisiveness, and obsessions. Participants use a 5-point Likert scale with scores ranging 
from 0 to 4 to indicate how much each statement is true of them. Test-retest reliability in 
a student sample was shown to be 0.91, and the internal consistency for the VOCI is α = 





(Thordarson et al., 2004; Radomsky et al., 2006). The internal consistency for the VOCI 
in the current study was α = 0.95. 
Disgust Scale (DS; Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994). The DS is a 32-item scale 
measuring an individual‟s sensitivity to a variety of disgust-related stimuli. Each item is 
accompanied by both a true or false question and a rated item indicating how disgusting 
participants believe the item to be using a 3-point Likert scale. Inter-item reliability has 
been shown to be excellent (Cronbach‟s α= 0.84; Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994). The 
internal consistency for the DS in the current study was α = 0.46. 
Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski & O‟Donohue, 1995).  The 
FSQ is an 18-item questionnaire designed to assess spider-related fears. Participants use 
an 8-point Likert scale to respond to questions pertaining to two factors: avoidance and/or 
help-seeking behaviours, and fear of harm. The internal consistency for the FSQ is α = 
0.92 (Szymanski & O‟Donohue, 1995). Additionally, this scale has been demonstrated to 
be useful when assessing low levels of fear, and is therefore a good questionnaire to use 
when studying nonclinical samples (Muris & Merckelbach, 1996). The internal 
consistency for the FSQ in the current study was α = 0.97. 
Spider Phobia Beliefs Questionnaire (SBQ; Arntz, Lavy, van den Berg, & van 
Rijsoort, 1993). The SBQ is a 78-item scale that assesses fearful beliefs about spiders as 
well as one‟s reaction to encountering spiders. Participants are asked to rate each item on 
a scale of 0 to 100. The scale is composed of two subscales: the spider-related beliefs 
subscale (items 1-42), and the self-related beliefs subscale (items 43-78). Both subscales 





Lavy, van den Berg, & van Rijsoort, 1993). The internal consistency for the SBQ in the 
current study was α = 0.98, with both subscales having α‟s = 0.97. 
Beck Depression Inventory-2 (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The BDI-II 
is a 21-item questionnaire that assesses symptoms of depression that have occurred 
during the past two weeks. Participants use a 4-point scale with scores ranging from 0 to 
3 to indicate the frequency at which they have experienced symptoms such as sadness, 
changes in appetite and sleep, and suicidal ideation. The internal consistency of this scale 
in undergraduates is α = 0.93. Good divergent and convergent validity for the BDI-II 
have also been demonstrated (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The internal consistency for 
the BDI-II in the current study was α = 0.89. 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1990). The BAI is a 21-item 
questionnaire designed to assess symptoms of anxiety. Participants use a 4-point Likert 
scale with scores ranging from 0 to 3 to indicate the frequency at which they have 
experienced symptoms such as sweating, racing heart, and dizziness. The internal 
consistency of this scale is α = 0.92. Additionally, scores on the BAI have been found to 
be more related to scores on other measures of anxiety (r = 0.48) than depression (r = 
0.25) when testing clinical populations (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). The 
internal consistency for the BAI in the current study was α = 0.89. 
Manipulation Believability Questionnaire (MBQ). The MBQ is an 8-item 
questionnaire that was created for this study based on similar measures previously used 
by our team. It assesses how believable participants found the manipulation to be (e.g., 
“Based on the information you were given, how convinced are you that the [paper/spider] 





manipulation (e.g., “How upset were you about the [paper/spider] having been in one of 
the boxes of objects you touched?”).  Participants responded to each question by selecting 
one of five multiple choice responses (e.g., definitely convinced, mostly convinced, 
somewhat convinced, a little convinced, not at all convinced). Two separate versions 
were used, one for each condition (Threat versus No-Threat), with the only differences 
being the wording of questions that specifically address the information from the 
manipulation (i.e., spider versus paper).  
Materials 
 The stimuli used in this study were 30 small objects purchased from a dollar store 
(see Appendix B for a full list). Each object fit the following criteria: no larger than 10 
cm in its largest dimension, at least one dimension larger than 4 cm, easily nameable (i.e., 
identifiable by the general population), not clearly associated with contamination (e.g., a 
sponge), and not too similar to other objects in the study (i.e., not easily confused with 
other study objects).  
 Two cardboard boxes with lids were used in the study. They were 30.5 by 38.1 by 
25.4 cm in size, and were identical other than being different colours (brown and white). 
The paper that was presented to the control group was a stack of three packages of plain 
white printer paper, still in their original wrapping. The tarantula that was presented in 
the threat condition was presented in a clear terrarium containing soil, two water dishes in 
the corners, and the tarantula (a Chilean Rose tarantula).  
Procedure 
 Participants were informed that they were taking part in a study that aimed to 





(see Appendix C for the consent form). Each participant was told that their responses 
during certain tasks would be compared to those of a clinical sample to see how their 
responses differ. The task they were asked to complete consisted of picking up a series of 
30 objects that had been placed in two separate boxes (one white, one brown; 15 items 
per box). The participants were asked to pick up the objects one at a time, alternating 
between the two boxes, with the experimenter dictating the order in which the objects 
were to be picked up. They were further instructed to use the hand that corresponded to 
the box location (i.e., left hand for the box on their left and right hand for the box on their 
right) when picking up the objects (for complete verbal instructions, see Appendix D).  
The following variables were counterbalanced across all participants: the side of 
the table on which each box was presented, the group of items in each box, the order in 
which each set of objects was presented (see Appendix B for item lists and orders), the 
side that participants were asked to take the first item from, and which box (left or right) 
would become the manipulated box. This was done in order to ensure that effects found 
in this study could not be readily attributed to order or location effects associated with 
any of these factors.  
For each object that participants picked up, they were asked to generate and say 
out loud a novel sentence describing the object, and then place the item back in its 
original box. These sentences were recorded verbatim by the experimenter (see Appendix 
E for the record form). After providing a sentence for each of the objects, they completed 
a distracter task. During the distracter task, participants were asked to count backwards 
out-loud in multiples of seven starting at 46,305 for three and a half minutes. Following 





Following the baseline recall memory test, participants were given additional 
information about the two boxes. All participants were told that one of the boxes is only 
used for the purposes of this study, which will be referred to as the un-manipulated box 
from this point forward. Participants were randomly assigned to either the control (No-
Threat) condition or the experimental (Threat) condition. The experimenter was blind to 
group assignment until this point in the study. The condition the participant was assigned 
to determined what they were told the typical contents of the second box were, which will 
be referred to as the manipulated box from this point forward. Depending upon the 
condition to which the participant was assigned (No-Threat or Threat), the experimenter 
brought either a stack of packaged paper or a tarantula housed in a terrarium into the 
room, after having told the participant that it was time for a break. In the No-Threat 
condition, the experimenter brought the paper into the testing room and told the 
participant the following: “I just needed to bring in this paper so I won‟t forget to put it 
back after we‟re finished. Our lab keeps it in this box (experimenter points to the 
manipulated box) so I constantly have to unload it and reload it when I am testing people 
for this study. It seems so silly that I have to put it back in the box instead of somewhere 
else, but I guess when people get used to something being somewhere they don‟t want it 
to change”. In the Threat condition, the experimenter brought the tarantula into the room 
and told the participant the following: “I just needed to bring in our tarantula because I 
have to clean his tank after this. It‟s such a pain. We have to clean it like every week and 
I always get stuck doing it. I guess it‟s probably because we figured out that he loves 
being in this box (experimenter points to the manipulated box) while we clean his tank. 





are used for my study, I get stuck doing it”. Following the manipulation, participants 
were asked to rate their current anxiety level, urge to wash their hands, and feelings of 
disgust. As an additional measure of disgust, participants were also asked how willing 
they would be to eat their lunch out of each of the two boxes (for a complete list of 
questions asked see Appendix F). After completing the aforementioned questions about 
their current emotional state, participants completed a second recall memory test.  
Participants concluded the study by filling out a number of self-report 
questionnaires to assess various symptoms of anxiety, disgust, spider fear, and 
depression. These questionnaires were administered in order to assess the nature of the 
student sample, as well as to confirm that there were no important differences between 
groups on these measures. For descriptions of the administered questionnaires, see 
Measures above (full questionnaires available in Appendix A). Following the completion 
of these questionnaires, participants were debriefed about the true purpose of the study as 
well as the rationale for use of mild deception (for the debriefing script, see Appendix D). 
Individuals in the experimental condition were informed that the tarantula never in fact 
touched the objects in the box and, for a small number of participants who were 
reportedly anxious due to the presence of the tarantula, were asked to remain in the 
laboratory until these feelings of anxiety had diminished. Additionally, all participants 
signed a second consent form prior to their departure (see Appendix C) agreeing that their 










 Very few missing data points were evident. When missing data points were 
identified on a questionnaire, the mean of the individual‟s other responses on the same 
questionnaire was used to replace the missing data point (Tabachnick & Fidel, 2007). 
There were no missing data points on any other variables (e.g., memory tests, questions 
pertaining to current mood state) due to the nature of how these data were collected 
during the study (i.e., through verbal responses). 
Manipulation check 
After the manipulation phase of the experiment, participants were asked to 
respond to a number of questions about their current feelings of anxiety, disgust, and 
contamination. As expected, there was a significant difference between groups on self-
reported explicit feelings of disgust, t(113) = 3.32, p = .001, d = 2.80, as well as on less 
explicitly stated feelings of disgust (i.e., one‟s willingness to eat their lunch out of the un-
manipulated versus the manipulated box), t(113) = 4.10, p < .001, d = 3.50. On both of 
these measures, participants in the Threat condition showed higher levels of disgust. 
Twenty-three individuals in the Threat condition reported higher than minimal levels of 
disgust (41.8%). Interestingly, multiple individuals in the No-Threat condition (n = 10, 
16.7%) also reported feeling more than minimal levels of disgust; as this was an 
unexpected occurrence, ratings of disgust were entered as a covariate in further analyses. 
There were no differences between groups in terms of anxiety level, t(113) = -0.063, p = 
.95, d = -0.06, or feelings of contamination, t(113) = -0.73, p = .47, d = -0.69
1
.  
                                                             
1 Levene‟s test of homogeneity of variance was significant (p < .05) for all manipulation check variables; 





Individuals in both groups were asked to complete a questionnaire following the 
completion of the study (MBQ), which asked about believability of the manipulation as 
well as self-reported distress due to the manipulation. Individuals in the No-Threat 
condition reported being less upset by the regular use of the boxes than those in the 
Threat condition, t(113) = -4.33, p < .001, d = -0.62; those in the Threat condition were 
also more distressed by the regular use of the boxes, t(113) = 3.50, p = .001, d = 0.60. 
Along with these expected differences between conditions, additional differences were 
found between conditions in terms of believability. Specifically, individuals in the Threat 
condition found the manipulation information easier to understand than those in the No-
Threat condition, t(113) = 2.03, p = .046, d = 0.23, but were less convinced by the 
information they were given, t(113) = 4.11, p < .001, d = -0.93. Although a difference 
between conditions was evident in ease of understanding the manipulation information, 
both conditions on average rated the information as „completely understandable‟. 
Additionally, although believability was lower in the Threat condition than in the No-
Threat condition, individuals in the Threat condition on average reported being  
„somewhat convinced‟ by the manipulation information. Therefore, these results do not 
suggest that the manipulation was not believed at all. 
Memory Performance 
 The mean number of items recalled at each time point and in each box by 
condition (as well as change scores over time) are listed in Table 2 below. The mean 
number of  items recalled in the first memory test was 18.45 (SD = 2.82), and in the 







Mean Recall Memory Scores by Group, Time and Box Type 
 
Box Type 
Time 1 Time 2 Change Score 
 
Threat No-Threat Threat No-Threat Threat No-Threat 





























































Independent samples t-tests were conducted in order to assess for condition 
differences in overall memory performance. Results showed a trend towards a significant 
difference between conditions for the total number of items recalled at time one, t(113) = 
-1.73, p = .09, d = -0.54, time two, t(113) = -1.90, p = .06, d = -0.82, and for total 
memory recall t(113) = -1.92, p = .06, d = -0.84 across the two time points, with 
individuals in the Threat condition showing poorer memory performance than those in 
the No-Threat condition.  
 Overall analyses 
 A 2 (condition) by 2 (box type) by 2 (time) mixed design analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) was conducted in order to determine if changes in memory occurred 
differentially between the experimental and control conditions. Due to condition 
differences on DS scores and unexpected state disgust ratings within conditions, both of 
these variables were entered into the analysis as covariates. Neither DS scores or state 
disgust ratings were significantly related to memory performance, F(1, 111) = 0.10, p = 
0.75, partial η² = .00 and F(1, 111) = 0.01, p = 0.95, partial η² = .00, respectively.  
Results showed a main effect of time, F(1, 111) = 6.31, p = 0.01, partial η² = .05, with 
individuals remembering more items overall at time 2 than at time 1. Main effects for 
both box type (manipulated versus un-manipulated) and condition (Threat versus No-
Threat) were not significant (F(1, 111) = .00, p = .96, partial η² < .001, and F(1, 111) = 
2.71, p = .10, partial η² = .02,  respectively). The interaction of time, box type, and 
condition showed a trend towards significance, F(1, 111) = 2.77, p = .099, partial η² = 
.02, with individuals in the Threat condition showing an increase in memory for items in 





Threat condition (see Figure 1)
2
. Figure 2 depicts a graphical representation of the 
difference scores between boxes (the number of items remembered from the manipulated 
box minus number of items remembered from the non-manipulated box) by both time 
and condition.  
A planned comparison was conducted in order to further understand the nature of 
the interaction between box type, condition, and time. The independent variable in this 
comparison was condition (Threat versus No-Threat), and the dependent variable was the 
proportion of the number of items remembered from the manipulated box to the number 
of items remembered from the un-manipulated box at time 2. Proportionate memory was 
the chosen variable for analysis because it appeared to be an appropriate measure of 
memory performance over time while taking into account memory‟s limited capacity. 
This value was calculated and entered separately for each participant prior to analysis. A 
one-way ANCOVA was conducted in order to include the covariates listed in the 
aforementioned mixed ANCOVA, as well as a covariate of the proportion of the number 
of items remembered from the manipulated box to the number of items remembered from 
the un-manipulated box at time 1 (i.e., initial memory performance). Adjusted means 
were 1.10 (SD = 0.28) for the Threat condition, and 1.02 (SD = 0.28) for the No-Threat 
condition. Results of this ANCOVA showed a significant difference between conditions, 
F(1, 114) = 4.83, p = .03, partial η² = .043, with individuals in the Threat condition 
showing a higher proportion 
                                                             
2
 When state disgust was not included as a covariate, results showed a main effect of time (F(1, 111) = 
6.94, p = 0.01, partial η² = .06), and a trend towards a main effect of condition (F(1, 111) = 3.22, p = .08, 
partial η² = .03). There was no main effect of box type (F(1, 111) = .01, p = .94, partial η² < .001. The 
interaction of time, box type, and condition was not significant, F(1, 111) = 1.67, p = .20, partial η² = .02. 
3 When state disgust was not included as a covariate, results showed a trend towards a significant difference 
between condition, F(1, 114) = 3.79, p = .05, partial η² = .03. Adjusted means were 1.09 (SD = 0.28) for the 






                                                                 
























































































































of items remembered in the manipulated to the un-manipulated boxes than individuals in 
the No-Threat condition. The difference between conditions based on proportions of 
items remembered from each box was not present at time 1, t(113) = -0.14, p = .90, d = -
.02. 
Discussion 
 This study aimed to investigate whether the provision of threatening information 
related to previously-learned neutral stimuli could increase memory for those stimuli. It 
was predicted that providing threatening information about neutrally encoded stimuli 
would cause an increase in memory for the now threatening stimuli. Results were in 
partial support of this hypothesis, in that there was a trend towards an interaction between 
condition (provision of threatening versus non-threatening information), time (before or 
after the provision of new information), and box (whether the box was the one with added 
information, or the one that remained neutral). Individuals in the Threat condition showed 
a trend towards remembering more threat-related than neutral items at the second 
memory test compared to the first memory test, whereas individuals in the No-Threat 
condition did not show this same pattern of change.  
Memory has a limit to its capacity (Miller, 1956); therefore, the degree to which 
overall memory could increase across time in the current study was limited. Accordingly, 
condition differences were also examined based on the proportion of items remembered 
that were manipulated versus un-manipulated, following the manipulation. Results 
showed a difference between the two conditions, with individuals in the Threat condition 
showing a higher proportion of manipulated to un-manipulated objects remembered, 





the No-Threat condition. Furthermore, this difference between conditions was not 
observed prior to the provision of new information. This is evidence for a memory bias 
for threat.  Support was provided for the hypothesis that individuals exposed to 
threatening information would show an increase in memory over time for threat-related 
stimuli compared to non-threat-related stimuli, whereas individuals exposed to additional 
neutral information would have an equal increase in memory for both the threat- and non-
threat-related stimuli. Additionally, the construct of hypermnesia (increased memory over 
time without additional learning; Ballard, 1913; Erdelyi & Becker, 1974) was apparent, 
in that item recall increased (on average) from time one to time two. 
Overall these results provide evidence that a change in memory for previously-
learned objects can occur following the provision of threatening information. This 
provides support for the theory that subsequent events occurring after encoding of 
information may lead to threat reappraisal (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). The results of this 
study provide theoretical support for the notion that new information one receives about a 
specific past event can change their memory of that event. Prior research shows that 
memory is important to the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders 
(Radomsky & Rachman, 2004; Hagenaars, van Minnen, Hoogduin, & Verbraak, 2009; 
Amir, Leiner, & Bomyea, 2010; Cody & Teachman, 2010; Morgan, 2010; Robinaugh & 
McNally, 2010), which leads to one hypothesis about how disorders of delayed onset 
may develop. Specifically, if the onset of a disorder relates to the interpretation of life 
events as threatening (either immediately following their occurrence or at some future 
point in time), reinterpretation of once-neutral events as threatening could theoretically 





Bower‟s (1981) theory of information processing predicts both attentional and 
memory biases for threat-related information. In the current study, all information was 
neutral at encoding; thus, the later increase in memory for threat-related information 
cannot be attributed to increased attention to these stimuli. The current results lend 
support to Bower‟s theory, and also to previous research demonstrating the existence of a 
memory bias for anxiety- or threat-related information (Nunn et al., 1984; Cloitre & 
Liebowitz, 1991; Cloitre et al., 1994; Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; Radomsky, 
Rachman, & Hammond, 2001; Coles, Turk, & Heimberg, 2007). It is proposed that the 
design of the current study facilitated detection of an effect due to ecological validity of 
the fear stimulus; therefore, future studies in this area should continue to use such 
methods in order to investigate the true nature of memory biases in anxiety. 
When considering disorders of delayed onset, the mechanisms by which memory 
may be affected are unclear. Similar to questions that have been put forth in relation to 
the misinformation effect (Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus, 1979; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 
1985), it is not known whether there is in fact a change in memory, a change in access to 
memory resources, or integration of new information with old information as a new 
memory. Although the current study was not capable of elucidating such information, it 
provides evidence that a change in memory can occur when threatening information is 
provided about previously neutral information. Further studies should investigate the 
specific mechanisms involved in memory‟s effect on delayed onset disorders. 
 The current study is the first to investigate mechanisms of delayed onset in 
anxiety other than anxiety related to PTSD. Given that anecdotal evidence supports the 





research can further our understanding of the genesis of anxiety disorders. Additionally, it 
is the first known attempt at experimentally demonstrating the phenomenon of delayed 
onset. This provides further evidence for the mechanisms that may underlie this 
construct.  
The results of this study have a number of clinical implications. Knowing that 
disorders can develop after time has passed since a triggering event will be useful in 
identifying individuals who are at risk of later developing a disorder, which may lead to 
the prevention of a vast number of anxiety disorders. Additionally, having an increased 
understanding of the mechanisms involved in the onset of a subset of disorders will 
provide opportunities to target specific therapeutic techniques that may work well for 
these individuals, such as the reappraisal of anxious memories. This may be an important 
focus in treatment for individuals with delayed onset disorders, given that the disorder 
will have come about at least partially due to threat re-appraisal. The current results 
provide an initial understanding of how disorders of delayed onset occur and how we 
may be able to reduce their occurrence and/or increase efficacy of treatment. 
 Although the results of the current study are promising, they are not without some 
limitations. First, the current study used a non-clinical sample, so generalization to 
individuals with clinical disorders is questionable. Effect sizes were not large and only a 
trend was evident, which may be in part due to low levels of anxiety or disgust reactions 
across participants in general. With the manipulation causing low levels (on average) of 
distress, elucidating a strong effect would be difficult.  However, given that the focus of 
this study was on delayed onset, a lengthy longitudinal study would be necessary in order 





this construct. An additional limitation is that the information provided to participants in 
the study (i.e., the manipulation) was not equally believable across conditions.  Although 
this was an unexpected difference, the manipulations in both conditions were described 
as at least somewhat believable; therefore, this condition difference should not greatly 
impact our conceptualization of the current results. In fact, due to reduced believability in 
the Threat condition, it is possible that increasing believability in this condition would in 
fact amplify the results of the current study.  
Generalization to real-world occurrences of delayed onset (in PTSD, for example) 
is also difficult, given that the change in memory that occurred in this study was for 
physical stimuli, whereas changes in memory associated with disorders of delayed onset 
are likely associated with other information. Although it could be argued that memory for 
objects parallels memory for information, and therefore would not be processed 
differently than one‟s memory for a situation, generalizability remains unknown. 
 This study was also limited by its short-term nature: participants completed both 
the pre- and post-manipulation memory tests within ten minutes. Given that when 
delayed onset is seen currently in PTSD it typically has an onset of months or years after 
the original event (Bryant & Harvey, 2002; Carty, O‟Donnell, & Creamer, 2006), it 
would be useful to examine to what extent these effects would be evident given a greater 
length of time between the event, the time at which additional threatening information is 
provided, and when the memory tests take place. 
Another limit to this study was the inability to obtain both pre- and post-
manipulation levels of anxiety. Due to the nature of the study, requesting pre-





affecting the results obtained. For this reason, it is difficult to determine whether or not 
there was in fact a difference between groups in terms of change in anxiety due to the 
manipulation. However, given that there were differences in self-reported disgust and 
disgust has been shown to be correlated with anxiety (Davey, MacDonald, & Brierly, 
2008; Olatunji, Cisler, & Phillips, 2010; Olatunji et al., 2007), and especially in the 
context of spider-related fears (Olatunji, Huijding, de Jong, & Smits, 2011), disgust 
reactions are presumed to be an appropriate proxy for anxiety. It should be noted that 
controlling for disgust, given that it was not the outcome variable of interest, does not 
remove the threat of the stimulus. 
As mentioned previously, there are many further directions that could enhance our 
knowledge in this area of research. Specifically, it would be useful to investigate these 
effects with a longer delay before the provision of new and threatening information (as 
this is more relevant to real-world examples of delayed onset), and also seeing how long 
the effects may last. It would also to be useful to examine these effects in participants 
with different types of threat-related manipulations, and with manipulations that will be 
able to elicit anxiety reactions rather than just disgust reactions. 
Greater understanding of the mechanisms involved in disorders of delayed onset 
may be possible through the use of longitudinal studies that would provide information 
about the experiences and retroactive memories of individuals who go on to develop 
these disorders. This suggestion is particularly important because it would provide the 








The present study demonstrated that individuals‟ memory for previously neutral 
stimuli can change when those stimuli later become threatening. The current results 
support findings of previous memory processing research and offer new support for the 
study of anxiety disorders with delayed onset, as well as potential mechanisms involved 
in their genesis. Although this study could not address many important questions related 
to the existence of disorders of delayed onset, it supports a combination of theories 
positing that delayed onset is not exclusively characteristic of PTSD. Further replication 
and investigation is necessary, but the current study provides results that further our 
understanding of the onset and maintenance of clinical anxiety, as well as creating 
potential for advances in the prevention and treatment of anxiety disorders. 
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Please circle T (true) or F (false) 
 
T     F     1.  It bothers me to see someone in a restaurant eating messy food with his  
fingers. 
 
T     F     2.  Seeing a cockroach in someone else‟s house doesn‟t bother me. 
 
T     F     3.  It bothers me to hear someone clear a throat full of mucous. 
 
T     F     4.  I think it is immoral for people to seek sexual pleasure from animals. 
 
T     F     5.  It would bother me to be in a science class and to see a human hand  
preserved in a jar. 
 
T     F     6.  I would go out of my way to avoid walking through a graveyard. 
 
T     F     7.  I never let any part of my body touch the toilet seat in public restrooms. 
 
T     F     8.  Even if I were hungry, I would not drink a bowl of my favorite soup if it  
had been stirred by a used but thoroughly washed flyswatter. 
 
T     F     9.  I might be willing to try eating monkey meat, under certain circumstances. 
 
T     F     10.  It would bother me to see a rat run across my path in a park. 
 
T     F     11. If I see someone vomit, it makes me sick to my stomach. 
 
T     F     12. I think homosexual activities are immoral. 
 
T     F     13. It would not upset me at all to watch a person with a glass eye take the eye  
out of the socket. 
 
T     F     14. It would bother me tremendously to touch a dead body. 
 
T     F     15. I probably would not go to my favorite restaurant if I found out that the  
cook had a cold. 
 
T     F     16. It would bother me to sleep in a nice hotel room if I knew that a man had  





Please rate (0, 1, 2) how disgusting you would find the following experiences. 
 0: not disgusting at all 
 1: slightly disgusting 
 2: very disgusting 
If you think something is bad or unpleasant, but not disgusting, you should write “0”. 
 
_______ 17. You see someone put ketchup on vanilla ice cream, and eat it. 
 
_______ 18. You see maggots on a piece of meat in an outdoor garbage pail. 
 
_______ 19. While you are walking through a tunnel under a railroad track, you smell  
                     urine. 
 
_______ 20. You hear about a 30 year old man who seeks sexual relationships with 80  
                     year old women. 
 
_______ 21. You see someone accidentally stick a fish hook through his finger. 
 
_______ 22. Your friend‟s pet cat dies, and you have to pick up the dead body with your  
         bare hands. 
 
_______ 23. You take a sip of soda, and then realize that you drank from the glass that an  
         acquaintance of yours had been drinking from. 
 
_______ 24. A friend offers you a piece of chocolate shaped like dog-doo. 
 
_______ 25. You are about to drink a glass of milk when you smell that it is spoiled. 
 
_______ 26. You are walking barefoot on concrete, and you step on an earthworm. 
 
_______ 27. You see a bowel movement left unflushed in a public toilet. 
 
_______ 28. You hear about an adult woman who has sex with her father. 
 
_______ 29. You see a man with his intestines exposed after an accident. 
 
_______ 30. You accidentally touch the ashes of a person who has been cremated. 
 
_______ 31. You discover that a friend of yours changes underwear only once a week. 
 
_______ 32. As part of a sex education class, you are required to inflate a new unlubricated  
         condom, using your mouth. 
 
© Haidt, J., McCauley, C., Rozin, P. (1994). Individual differences in sensitivity to disgust: A scale sampling seven 








For each item, please record a number to indicate how much you agree with the statement. 
Ratings can include any number between 0 (totally disagree) and 7 (totally agree). 
 
 
Totally Disagree                  Totally Agree 
0 ------------ 1 ------------ 2 ------------ 3 ------------ 4 ------------ 5 ------------ 6 ------------ 7 
 
 
____ 1.  If I came across a spider now, I would get help from someone else to remove it. 
 
____ 2.  Currently, I am sometimes on the look-out for spiders. 
 
____ 3.  If I saw a spider now, I would think it will harm me. 
 
____ 4.  I now think a lot about spiders. 
 
____ 5.  I would be somewhat afraid to enter a room now, where I have seen a spider before. 
 
____ 6.  I now would do anything to try to avoid a spider. 
 
____ 7.  Currently, I sometimes think about getting bit by a spider. 
 
____ 8.  If I encountered a spider now, I wouldn’t be able to deal effectively with it. 
 
____ 9.  If I encountered a spider now, it would take a long time to get it out of my mind. 
 
____ 10.  If I came across a spider now, I would leave the room. 
 
____ 11.  If I saw a spider now, I would think it will try to jump on me. 
 
____ 12.  If I saw a spider now, I would ask someone else to kill it. 
 
____ 13.  If I encountered a spider now, I would have images of it trying to get me. 
 
____ 14.  If I saw a spider now, I would be afraid of it. 
 
____ 15.  If I saw a spider now, I would feel very panicky. 
 
____ 16.  Spiders are one of my worst fears. 
 
____ 17.  I would feel very nervous if I saw a spider now. 
 
____ 18.  If I saw a spider now, I would probably break out in a sweat and my heart would beat  









SBQ - Part I 
This questionnaire is concerned with thoughts that might run through your mind at the moment that you 
encounter a spider. Beside each thought, fill in the extent to which you believe in the thought. Do not indicate the 
strength of your belief at this moment, but the strength of your belief at the moment that you encounter a spider 
and you are possibly anxious.  
 
Rate the strength of your belief in each thought by using the scale indicated below. You can write down any 
number from 0 to 100 as long as it expresses the strength of your belief in the thought at the moment you 
encounter a spider. 
            
           0  ---------------------------------------------- 100 
 
I do not 
believe it at all 
 I absolutely 
believe it 
 
When there is a spider in my vicinity, I believe that the spider… 
_____    1.  will come towards me. 
_____    2.  will jump on me.  
_____    3.  will crawl into my clothes. 
_____    4.  will bite me. 
_____    5.  will attack me. 
_____    6.  will crawl towards my private parts. 
_____    7.  senses that I‟m anxious. 
_____    8.  knows that I‟m anxious and that I   
                   cannot stand it. 
_____    9.  does things on purpose to tease me. 
_____  10.  is mean.   
_____  11.  is poisonous. 
_____  12.  is deadly. 
_____  13.  is dangerous. 
_____  14.  is horrible. 
_____  15.  is dirty. 
_____  16.  is unpredictable. 
_____  17.  is vicious. 
_____  18.  is incalculable. 
_____  19.  is very quick. 
_____  20.  is uncontrollable. 
_____  21.  runs in an elusive way. 
_____  22.  usually travels in pairs. 
_____  23.  will become larger. 
_____  24.  hides itself. 
_____  25.  runs very fast. 
_____  26.  will chase me. 
_____  27.  is staring at me. 
_____  28.  will settle in spots I do not want, like my bed. 
    
_____  29.  will pop up unexpectedly. 
_____  30.  will control me. 
_____  31.  will walk all over me during the night. 
_____  32.  will hide itself and pop up unexpectedly 10 
                   times as big, or with other spiders. 
_____  33.  will drive me to the wall. 
_____  34.  cannot be shaken off once it is on me. 
_____  35.  especially selects me because of my fear. 
_____  36.  hides itself in order to pop up unexpectedly. 
 
_____  37.  wants to come upon me on parts of me that 
                   I cannot reach. 
_____  38.  becomes (in my imagination) very large and  
                   holds me with its legs. 
_____  39.  will settle on my face. 
_____  40.  is never alone, there are always more of them. 
 
_____  41.  will drop from the ceiling on me. 
_____  42.  is spying on me. 
_____  43.  other (please describe) ____________________ 
                  _______________________________________ 
_____  44.  other (please describe) ____________________ 





SBQ – Part II 
 
The following section presents thoughts that you might have about yourself at the moment that you encounter a 
spider and are possibly anxious. 
 
You can write down any number from 0 to 100 as long as it expresses the strength of your belief in the thought at 
the moment you encounter a spider. 
 
           
           0  ---------------------------------------------- 100 
 
I do not 
believe it at all 




If the spider does not go away, I will… 
 
_____  45.  become crazy because of anxiety. 
_____  46.  not be able to stand it. 
_____  47.  panic completely and not know what  
                   I‟m doing. 
_____  48.  die of fear. 
_____  49.  lose control. 
_____  50.  have to be transported to a hospital or  
                   psychiatric ward. 
_____  51.  become so anxious that other people  
                   will think I‟m an idiot. 
_____  52.  endanger myself or others. 
_____  53.  lash out fiercely. 
_____  54.  become sick with anxiety. 
_____  55.  jump out of a window or out of a  
                   moving car. 
_____  56.  get a heart attack. 
_____  57.  scream or yell uncontrollably. 
_____  58.  get creepy dreams. 
_____  59.  think of myself as a hysterical or as an  
                   idiot. 
_____  60.  become even more anxious about  
                   spiders. 
_____  61.  faint. 
 
_____  62.  come to see spiders everywhere. 
 
_____  63.  cause an accident. 
_____  64.  damage my heart. 
_____  65.  vomit. 
_____  66.  be unable to function normally anymore. 
_____  67.  beat up someone. 
_____  68.  dare nothing anymore and be overwhelmed  
                   with fear. 
_____  69.  cry uncontrollably. 
_____  70.  become paralyzed.  
_____  71.  be unable to sleep for days. 
_____  72.  become aggressive (beat, kick, throw). 
_____  73.  become hysterical. 
_____  74.  stiffen completely from anxiety. 
_____  75.  be unable to get the animal out of my mind. 
_____  76.  want to be dead. 
_____  77.  run away blindly. 
_____  78.  be unable to think rationally. 
_____  79.  get nightmares of creepy spiders. 
_____  80.  be unable to do anything. 
_____  81.  other (please describe) ________________ 
                  ____________________________________ 
_____  82.  other (please describe) ________________ 







Please rate each statement by putting a circle around the number that best describes how much the 
statement is true of you.  Please answer every item, without spending too much time on any particular 
item. 
 




A little Some Much Very 
Much 
1. I feel compelled to check letters over and over 
before mailing them. 
0 1 2 3 4 
2. I am often upset by my unwanted thoughts of using 
a sharp weapon. 
0 1 2 3 4 
3. I feel very dirty after touching money. 0 1 2 3 4 
4. I find it very difficult to make even trivial decisions. 0 1 2 3 4 
5. I feel compelled to be absolutely perfect. 0 1 2 3 4 
6. I repeatedly experience the same unwanted thought 
or image about an accident. 
0 1 2 3 4 
7. I repeatedly check and recheck things like taps and 
switches after turning them off. 
0 1 2 3 4 
8. I use an excessive amount of disinfectants to keep 
my home or myself safe from germs. 
0 1 2 3 4 
9. I often feel compelled to memorize trivial things 
(e.g., licence plate numbers, instructions on labels). 
0 1 2 3 4 
10. I have trouble carrying out normal household 
activities because my home is so cluttered with 
things I have collected. 
0 1 2 3 4 
11. After I have decided something, I usually worry 
about my decision for a long time. 
0 1 2 3 4 
12. I find that almost every day I am upset by 
unpleasant thoughts that come into my mind 
against my will. 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. I spend far too much time washing my hands. 0 1 2 3 4 
14. I often have trouble getting things done because I 
try to do everything exactly right. 
0 1 2 3 4 
15. Touching the bottom of my shoes makes me very 
anxious. 
0 1 2 3 4 
16. I am often upset by my unwanted thoughts or 
images of sexual acts.  









A little Some Much Very 
Much 
17. I become very anxious when I have to make even a 
minor decision. 
0 1 2 3 4 
18. I feel compelled to follow a very strict routine when 
doing ordinary things. 
0 1 2 3 4 
19. I feel upset if my furniture or other possessions are 
not always in exactly the same position. 
0 1 2 3 4 
20. I repeatedly check that my doors or windows are 
locked, even though I try to resist the urge to do so. 
0 1 2 3 4 
21. I find it very difficult to touch garbage or garbage 
bins. 
0 1 2 3 4 
22. I become very tense or upset when I think about 
throwing anything away.  
0 1 2 3 4 
23. I am excessively concerned about germs and disease. 0 1 2 3 4 
24. I am often very late because I can’t get through 
ordinary tasks on time. 
0 1 2 3 4 
25. I avoid using public telephones because of possible 
contamination. 
0 1 2 3 4 
26. I am embarrassed to invite people to my home 
because it is full of piles of worthless things I have 
saved. 
0 1 2 3 4 
27. I repeatedly experience the same upsetting thought 
or image about death. 
0 1 2 3 4 
28. I am often upset by unwanted thoughts or images of 
blurting out obscenities or insults in public. 
0 1 2 3 4 
29. I worry far too much that I might upset other people. 0 1 2 3 4 
30. I am often frightened by unwanted urges to drive or 
run into oncoming traffic. 
0 1 2 3 4 
31. I almost always count when doing a routine task. 0 1 2 3 4 
32. I feel very contaminated if I touch an animal. 0 1 2 3 4 









A little Some Much Very 
Much 
34. I often experience upsetting and unwanted 
thoughts about losing control. 
0 1 2 3 4 
35. I find it almost impossible to decide what to keep 
and what to throw away. 
0 1 2 3 4 
36. I am strongly compelled to count things. 0 1 2 3 4 
37. I repeatedly check that my stove is turned off, even 
though I resist the urge to do so. 
0 1 2 3 4 
38. I get very upset if I can’t complete my bedtime 
routine in exactly the same way every night. 
0 1 2 3 4 
39. I am very afraid of having even slight contact with 
bodily secretions (blood, urine, sweat, etc.). 
0 1 2 3 4 
40. I am often very upset by my unwanted impulses to 
harm other people. 
0 1 2 3 4 
41. I spend a lot of time every day checking things over 
and over again. 
0 1 2 3 4 
42. I have great trouble throwing anything away because 
I am very afraid of being wasteful. 
0 1 2 3 4 
43. I frequently have to check things like switches, 
faucets, appliances and doors several times. 
0 1 2 3 4 
44. One of my major problems is that I am excessively 
concerned about cleanliness. 
0 1 2 3 4 
45. I feel compelled to keep far too many things like old 
magazines, newspapers, and receipts because I am 
afraid I might need them in the future. 
0 1 2 3 4 
46. I repeatedly experience upsetting and unacceptable 
thoughts of a religious nature. 
0 1 2 3 4 
47. I tend to get behind in my work because I repeat the 
same thing over and over again. 
0 1 2 3 4 
48. I try to put off making decisions because I’m so afraid 
of making a mistake. 
0 1 2 3 4 
49. I often experience upsetting and unwanted 
thoughts about illness. 
0 1 2 3 4 
50. I am afraid to use even well-kept public toilets 
because I am so concerned about germs. 
0 1 2 3 4 
51. Although I try to resist, I feel compelled to collect a 
large quantity of things I never actually use. 









A little Some Much Very 
Much 
52. I repeatedly experience upsetting and unwanted 
immoral thoughts. 
0 1 2 3 4 
53. One of my major problems is that I pay far too much 
attention to detail. 
0 1 2 3 4 
54. I am often upset by unwanted urges to harm myself. 0 1 2 3 4 
55. I spend far too long getting ready to leave home 
each day because I have to do everything exactly 
right. 
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Below is a list of common symptoms of anxiety. Please read each item in the list carefully. Indicate how 
much you have been bothered by each symptom during the PAST WEEK, INCLUDING TODAY by 















It was very 
unpleasant 







1 Numbness or tingling     
2 Feeling hot     
3 Wobbliness in legs     
4 Unable to relax     
5 Fear of worst happening     
6 Dizzy or lightheaded     
7 Heart pounding or racing     
8 Unsteady     
9 Terrified     
10 Nervous     
11 Feelings of choking     
12 Hands trembling     
13 Shaky     
14 Fear of losing control     
15 Difficulty breathing     
16 Fear of dying     
17 Scared     
18 Indigestion or discomfort in abdomen     
19 Faint     
20 Face flushed     











This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each group of statements 
carefully, and then pick out the one statement in each group that best describes the way you have 
been feeling during the past two weeks, including today. Circle the number beside the statement 
you have picked. If several statements in the group seem to apply equally well, circle the highest 
number for that group. Be sure that you do not choose more than one statement for each group. 
 
1)  Sadness 7)  Self-Dislike 
0 I do not feel sad. 0 I feel the same about myself as ever. 
1 I feel sad much of the time. 1 I have lost confidence in myself. 
2 I am sad all the time. 2 I am disappointed in myself. 
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can‟t stand it. 3 I dislike myself. 
 
2)  Pessimism 8)  Self-Criticalness 
0 I am not discouraged about my future. 0 I don‟t criticize or blame myself more 
than usual. 
1 I feel more discouraged about my future 
than I used to be. 
1 
 
I am more critical of myself than I used 
to be. 
2 I do not expect things to work out for me. 2 I criticize myself for all the faults. 
3 I feel my future is hopeless and will only 
get worse. 
3 I blame myself for everything bad that 
happens. 
 
3)  Past Failure 9)  Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes 




I have failed more than I should have. 
 
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I 
would not carry them out. 
2 As I look back, I see a lot of failures. 2 I would like to kill myself. 
3 I feel I am a total failure as a person. 3 I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
 
4)  Loss of Pleasure 10)  Crying                                            
0 I get as much pleasure as I ever did from 
the things I enjoy. 
0 
 
I don‟t cry any more than I used to. 
 
1 I don‟t enjoy things as much as I used to. 1 I cry more now than I used to. 
2 I get very little pleasure from the things I  
used to enjoy. 
2 I cry over every little thing. 
3 I can‟t get any pleasure from the things I 
used to enjoy. 
 










5)  Guilty Feelings 11)  Agitation 
0 I don‟t feel particularly guilty. 0 I am no more restless or wound up than 
usual. 
1 I feel guilty over many things I have done 




I feel more restless or wound up than 
usual. 




I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
I feel guilty all the time. 
3 I am so restless or agitated that I have to 
keep moving or doing something. 
 
6)  Punishment Feelings 12)  Loss of Interest 




I feel I may be punished. 
 
1 I am less interested in other people or 
things than before. 
2 I expect to be punished. 2 I have lost most of my interest in other 
people or things. 
3 I feel I am being punished. 3 It‟s hard to get interested in anything. 
 
 
13) Indecisiveness 18)  Changes in Appetite 
0 I make decisions about as well as ever. 0 I have not experienced any changes in my              
k appetite. 




My appetite is somewhat less than usual. 
My appetite is somewhat greater than  
usual. 
2 I have much greater difficulty in making  
decisions than I used to. 
2a 
2b 
My appetite is much less than usual. 
My appetite is much greater than usual. 
3 I have trouble making any decision. 3a I have no appetite at all. 
  3b I crave food all the time. 
 
14) Worthlessness 19)  Concentration Difficulty 
0 I do not feel I am worthless. 0 I can concentrate as well as usual. 
1 I don‟t consider myself as worthwhile 
and useful as I used to. 
1 
 
I can‟t concentrate as well as usual. 
 
2 I feel more worthless as compared to 
other people. 
2 It‟s hard to keep my mind on anything for 
very long. 











15) Loss of Energy 20)  Tiredness or Fatigue 
0 I have as much energy as ever. 0 I am no more tired or fatigued than usual. 





I don‟t have enough energy to do very 
much. 





I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the 
things I used to do. 
I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the 
things I used to do. 
 
16) Changes in Sleeping Pattern  21)  Loss of Interest in Sex 
0 I have not experienced any changes in  
my sleeping pattern. 
0 I have not noticed any recent change in 
my interest in sex. 
1a I sleep somewhat more than usual. 1 I am less interested in sex than I used to 
be. 
1b I sleep somewhat less than usual. 2 I am much less interested in sex now. 
2a I sleep a lot more than usual. 3 I have lost interest in sex completely. 
2b I sleep a lot less than usual.   
3a I sleep most of the day.   
3b I wake up 1-2 hours early and can‟t get 





0 I am no more irritable than usual.   
1 I am more irritable than usual.   
2 I am much more irritable than usual.   






















1. Were you pleased with the experimenter today? 
 
a. Completely pleased  
b. Very pleased 
c. Moderately pleased 
d. Not very pleased 
e. Not pleased at all 
 
2. Did the experimenter notify you of the regular use of the boxes in a way that was clear 
and understandable? 
 
a. Completely understandable 
b. Mostly understandable 
c. Somewhat understandable 
d. A little understandable 
e. Not at all understandable 
 
3. Were you bothered by the actual use of the boxes? 
 
a. Completely bothered 
b. Very bothered 
c. Moderately bothered 
d. Not very bothered 
e. Not bothered at all 
 
4. How upset were you about the paper having been in one of the boxes of objects you 
touched? 
 
a. Completely upset 
b. Very upset 
c. Moderately upset 
d. Not very upset 
e. Not upset at all 
 
5. Was the experimenter professional while providing information about the use of the 
boxes? 
 
a. Completely professional 
b. Mostly professional 
c. Somewhat professional 
d. A little professional 










6. Based on the information you were given, how convinced are you that the paper is 
usually kept in one of the boxes? 
 
a. Definitely convinced 
b. Mostly convinced 
c. Somewhat convinced 
d. A little convinced 
e. Not at all convinced 
 
7. Would you recommend this experiment to others? 
 
a. Definitely recommend 
b. Most likely recommend 
c. Maybe recommend 
d. Likely not recommend 
e. Definitely not recommend 
 
8. Would you choose this experimenter again in the future? 
 
a. Definitely 
b. Most likely 
c. Maybe 
d. Not likely 





























1. Were you pleased with the experimenter today? 
 
a. Completely pleased  
b. Very pleased 
c. Moderately pleased 
d. Not very pleased 
e. Not pleased at all 
 
2. Did the experimenter notify you of the regular use of the boxes in a way that was clear 
and understandable? 
 
a. Completely understandable 
b. Mostly understandable 
c. Somewhat understandable 
d. A little understandable 
e. Not at all understandable 
 
3. Were you bothered by the actual use of the boxes? 
 
a. Completely bothered 
b. Very bothered 
c. Moderately bothered 
d. Not very bothered 
e. Not bothered at all 
 
4. How upset were you about the spider having been in one of the boxes of objects you 
touched? 
 
a. Completely upset 
b. Very upset 
c. Moderately upset 
d. Not very upset 
e. Not upset at all 
 
5. Was the experimenter professional while providing information about the use of the 
boxes? 
 
a. Completely professional 
b. Mostly professional 
c. Somewhat professional 
d. A little professional 










6. Based on the information you were given, how convinced are you that the spider spends 
time in one of the boxes? 
 
a. Definitely convinced 
b. Mostly convinced 
c. Somewhat convinced 
d. A little convinced 
e. Not at all convinced 
 
7. Would you recommend this experiment to others? 
 
a. Definitely recommend 
b. Most likely recommend 
c. Maybe recommend 
d. Likely not recommend 
e. Definitely not recommend 
 
8. Would you choose this experimenter again in the future? 
 
a. Definitely 
b. Most likely 
c. Maybe 
d. Not likely 





























List of objects: 
 
 
Complete object list 




















COMPLETE OBJECT LIST 
 
1) Clothes pin 
2) Frog 
3) Glass jar 
4) Tennis ball 
5) Toothpaste  
6) Eraser 
7) Bird 





































































































































Informed Consent Forms: 
 
 
First Consent Form 
























This is to state that I agree to participate in a program of research being conducted by Dr. Adam S. 




I have been informed that the purpose of this study is to expand on existing work on free associations and 
see how people describe different objects. All results will be compared to those of clinical samples to see if 




If you agree to participate in this study, you will first be asked to take part in an object description task. 
You will be asked to rate your current mood and thoughts, and to fill out a paper-based questionnaire 
package.  Once you have completed the study, we will fully explain the hypotheses of the study and answer 
any questions you may have about the experiment. The study should take approximately 60 minutes to 
complete, and will take place in SP-215. For your participation, you will be entered in draw for a chance to 
win a cash prize ranging from 50$ to 300$, OR course credit if you are part of the Psychology Department 
Participant Pool. 
 
C. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation in this study at any 
time, without any negative consequences whatsoever. I understand that all information obtained will be 
kept strictly confidential and will be stored under lock and key for a period of seven years after which they 
will be shredded. Access to this information will be made available only to restricted members of Dr. 
Radomsky‟s research team. I understand that to ensure my confidentiality all data will be coded by number 
only and will be kept separate from my name. I understand that data from this study may be published, but 
that no identifying information will be released. 
 
If you have any questions concerning the study, please feel free to ask the experimenter now. If other 
questions or concerns come up following the study, please feel free to contact our laboratory at (514) 848-
2424, ext. 2199. 
 
Adam S. Radomsky, Ph.D., Associate Professor 
Jessica M. Senn, B.A., Graduate Student 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I 
FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
 
NAME (please print) __________________________________       AGE __________ 
 
SIGNATURE ________________________________________      GENDER   M / F 
 
WITNESS SIGNATURE _______________________________ 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact Adela Reid, Research Ethics and  
Compliance Office, Concordia University, at 514-848-2424, ext. 7481 or by e-mail at Adela.Reid@concordia.ca 







As you have just been informed, the use of deceptive information was essential in this study in 
order to determine if a memory bias could be observed after neutral information had already been 
learned.   
 
By signing below you indicate that you have been informed of this minor deception and allow us 
to include your results in our analyses. Given the nature of this deception, we ask that you refrain 









If you have any questions concerning this study, please feel free to ask the researcher or call the 
lab at 848-2424, ext. 5965. 
 
A. Radomsky, Ph.D., Associate Professor. 
































Object association task 
























 The study you are about to take part in is an expansion of previous work on free 
associations (free association is a task in which someone is normally presented with a 
word or object, and is asked to say the first thing that comes to mind). Today, we will 
have you complete free association tasks and also answer some questions about your 
mood and your thoughts. We are asking these questions so that we can compare the types 
of responses given by a university student sample to those given by people who have 
been diagnosed with different mood and anxiety disorders (such as depression, panic 
disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, etc.). So, we have two groups in this study, the 
student group and the clinical group. The clinical group is made up of individuals who 

















Object Association Task 
Each of these boxes contains a number of everyday objects. After I take the lids 
off the boxes, I am going to ask you to pick up the objects in the two boxes one at a time, 
alternating between the boxes. I will tell you which object to pick up. When I tell you to 
pick up a particular object, please use the hand that corresponds to the box location in 
which you find the object. For example, when I say an object from the box on your left, 
please pick it up with your left hand. When I say an object from the box on your right, 
please pick it up with your right hand. For each object you pick up, please say a sentence 
or statement to describe it, using the name of the object in your sentence. Because this is 
a study about free association, I will ask you to say the first thing that comes to mind, as 
long as it describes the object you are holding. Please try not to use the same sentence 
structure for every object – try to vary the types of sentences you provide. When you are 
finished creating your sentence, place the object back into the box you picked it up from 
and wait for me to tell you what object to pick up next.  
So for example, if I were to ask you to pick up the balloon from the box on your 
right, you would use your right hand to pick up the balloon, and state the first sentence 
that comes to mind using the name of the object in the sentence. So you may say 
something like “This ballon is deflated, so it isn‟t ready to be used as a party decoration 
yet.” Then you would put the balloon back into the box on your right and wait for me to 
inform you of the next object to pick up. Do you have any questions? (Open boxes) 
Please take a quick second to look into the boxes, and then I will ask you not to look in 
the boxes unless you are picking up an object. Okay, let‟s get started. From the box on 







Just give me a second – I need to go and take care of something. 
Experimental Condition:  
Note: the following script was delivered while carrying in the tarantula, setting it on the 
testing table, and fiddling with paperwork. This was done in order to make it seem more 
like random information than an obvious experimental manipulation. 
Sorry about that. I just needed to bring in our tarantula because I have to clean his 
tank after this. It‟s such a pain. We have to clean it like every week and I always get 
stuck doing it. I guess it‟s probably because we figured out that he loves being in this box 
(point to MANIPULATED box) while we clean his tank. When he‟s in there, he crawls 
all over the objects that we keep in there and is so much more active than usual. So since 
the objects are used for my study, I get stuck doing it. 
That other box of objects (point to UN-MANIPULATED box) is great because 
we only use it for the study. The spider has never even seen the objects in that box. I 
don‟t know why they can‟t just order an extra box for me... I‟ve already asked a couple 
times, but they keep forgetting. An extra box would make my life much easier. Anyways 
sorry for talking your ear off, I just didn‟t want to forget about this. You can just sit 
quietly for the rest of the break. 
Control Condition: 
Note: the following script was delivered while carrying in the paper, setting it on the 
testing table, and fiddling with paperwork. This was done in order to make it seem more 






Sorry about that. I just needed to bring in this paper so I won‟t forget to put it 
back after we‟re finished. Our lab keeps it in this box (point to MANIPULATED box) 
so I constantly have to unload it and reload it when I am testing people for this study. It 
seems so silly that I have to put it back in the box instead of somewhere else, but I guess 
when people get used to something being somewhere they don‟t want it to change. 
That other box (point to UN-MANIPULATED box) is great because we only use it for 
the study. I don‟t know why they can‟t just order an extra box for me... I‟ve already asked 
a couple times, but they keep forgetting. An extra box would make my life much easier. 
Anyways sorry for talking your ear off, I just didn‟t want to forget about this. You can 



















Okay, that concludes the experiment. We just have a few things to go through 
before you leave. First, let‟s discuss this debriefing form. This study was not actually 
about free associations. We are actually trying to test memory for information, and more 
specifically, whether or not your memory for items can change if you are given new 
information after original learning of information.  
Experimental Condition: 
You were in the experimental group of this study, and there was also a control 
group. All individuals in the experimental group were told that one box was neutral and 
one box was used for our tarantula, which it in fact is not. All individuals in the control 
group were told that one box is neutral and that the other box typically holds paper, 
which again, it does not. In other words, the tarantula has never actually touched the 
objects that you touched. We want to know if adding threatening information to 
something that was encoded neutrally can increase memory for the originally learned 
stimuli. In order to properly test our hypotheses, we need participants to be unaware of 
the memory tests or of the spider, so please keep this information to yourself, and do not 
share it with any of your peers. Do you have any questions about the purpose of the 
study? 
Control Condition: 
You were in the control group of this study, and there was also an experimental 
group. All individuals in the control group were told that one box is neutral and that the 





experimental group were told that one box was neutral and one box held something 
threatening, which again it did not. We want to know if adding threatening information to 
something that was encoded neutrally can increase memory for the originally learned 
stimuli. In order to properly test our hypotheses, we need participants to be unaware of 
the memory tests or of the potential of being in the threatening condition, so please keep 
this information to yourself, and do not share it with any of your peers. Do you have any 
questions about the purpose of the study? 
Both Conditions: 
We needed to use some deception in this study in order to ensure that participants 
would not know that their memory was going to be tested. We also had to falsely inform 
you about the use of the box so that we could change what you thought about those 
objects. Because these are forms of deception, we are required to ask you to fill out this 
form indicating that you understand why deception was used, and that you agree to let us 
use your data. Please read through the form and sign if you agree to the terms. 









































OBJECT DESCRIPTION TASK:  
 
EXPERIMENTER: (Please dictate to the participant the order in which they should pick 
up the objects from each box using the two lists provided.)  
 
Shaded = participant‟s left; White = participant‟s right 
 

































































































































































MOOD STATE QUESTIONS 
 
Now I am going to ask you some questions about your current mood. 
 
HAPPINESS 
On a scale of 0-100, where 0 means “not at all happy” and 100 means “extreme 




On a scale of 0-100, where 0 means “not at all likely” and 100 means “extremely likely, 
the most you have ever felt in your life”, how likely are you to give money to a homeless 




On a scale of 0-100, where 0 means “not at all tired” and 100 means “extremely tired, the 




On a scale of 0-100, where 0 means “not at all likely” and 100 means “extremely likely, 





On a scale of 0-100, where 0 means “not at all similar” and 100 means “extremely 
similar, the most you have ever felt in your life”, how similar are these boxes to the types 




On a scale of 0-100, where 0 means “not at all likely” and 100 means “extremely likely, 











On a scale of 0-100, where 0 means “not at all anxious” and 100 means “extreme anxiety, 




On a scale of 0-100, where 0 means “not at all disgusted” and 100 means “extremely 




On a scale of 0-100, where 0 means “not at all relaxed” and 100 means “extremely 
relaxed, the most you have ever felt in your life”, how relaxed do you feel right now? 
 
___________ 
URGES TO WASH 
On a scale of 0-100, where 0 means “no urge to wash your hands” and 100 means 
“extreme urge to wash your hands, the most you have ever felt in your life”, what is your 




On a scale of 0-100, where 0 means “not at all hungry” and 100 means “extremely 





On a scale of 1-100, where 0 means “not at all willing” and 100 means “completely 
willing”, how willing would you be to eat your lunch out of the box we use for the 




On a scale of 1-100, where 0 means “not at all willing” and 100 means “completely 
willing”, how willing would you be to eat your lunch out of the box that is only used for  
this study? 
____________ 
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